By Kamran Nayeri, May 1, 2026
At 11 in the morning on February
11, President Trump sat in the Situation Room in the White House but not in his
usual position at the head of the mahogany, but on the side to see the large
screen on the wall and listen to Benjamin Netanyahu’s presentation, aided his
team including David Barnea, the director of Mossad, Israel’s foreign
intelligence agency and Israeli military leaders. Netanyahu had been pressing
for months for the United States to agree to a major assault on Iran. Susie
Wiles, the White House chief of staff; Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who
doubled as the national security adviser; Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth; Gen.
Dan Caine, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and John Ratcliffe, the
C.I.A. director, were present. Additionally,
Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law, and Steve Witkoff, Trump’s special envoy,
who had been negotiating with the Iranians, rounded out the main group (Swan
and Haberman, April 7, 2026).
Netanyahu argued that Iran was ripe
for regime change, expressing the belief that a joint U.S.-Israeli military
attack could finally bring an end to the Islamic Republic. At one point, he
showed a brief video featuring a montage of potential new leaders who could
take over the country if the regime fell. Among those featured was Reza
Pahlavi, the 65-year-old son of the shah whose dictatorial regime was
overthrown in the massive 1979 Iranian revolution.
Netanyahu and his team outlined
conditions that made for an almost certain victory of such an attack: Iran’s
ballistic missile program could be destroyed in a few weeks. The regime would
be so weakened that it could not choke off the Strait of Hormuz, and the
likelihood that Iran would deal blows to U.S. interests in neighboring
countries was assessed as minimal.
Netanyahu’s presentation that took
led to a series of discussions in which Mr. Trump weighed his options and the
risks before giving the go-ahead to join Israel in attacking Iran. They said Mossad’s
intelligence indicated that once the main leaders of the Islamic Republic
regime were assassinated
“Street protests
inside Iran would begin again, and — with the impetus of the Israeli spy agency
helping to foment riots and rebellion — an intense bombing campaign could
foster the conditions for the Iranian opposition to overthrow the regime. The
Israelis also raised the prospect of Iranian Kurdish fighters crossing the
border from Iraq to open a ground front in the northwest, further stretching
the regime’s forces and accelerating its collapse.” (ibid.)
“Sounds good to me,” Trump told
Netanyahu, signaling a likely green light for a joint U.S.-Israeli operation.
“Mr. Netanyahu was
not the only one who came away from the meeting with the impression that Mr.
Trump had all but made up his mind. The president’s advisers could see that he
had been deeply impressed by the promise of what Mr. Netanyahu’s military and intelligence
services could do, just as he had been when the two men spoke before the 12-day
war with Iran in June.” (ibid.)
The next day, in a meeting with
Trump and his close aides, two senior intelligence officials briefed the
president.
“The intelligence
officials had deep expertise in U.S. military capabilities, and they knew the
Iranian system and its players inside out. They had broken down Mr. Netanyahu’s
presentation into four parts. First was decapitation- killing the ayatollah.
Second was crippling Iran’s capacity to project power and threaten its
neighbors. Third was a popular uprising inside Iran. And fourth was regime
change, with a secular leader installed to govern the country (ibid.).”
The CIA director, Ratcliffe, used
one word to describe the Israeli prime minister’s regime change scenarios:
“farcical.” Rubio cut in. “In other words, it’s bullshit,” Ratcliffe added that
given the unpredictability of events in any conflict, regime change could
happen, but it should not be considered an achievable objective. Vice President
JD Vance also expressed strong skepticism about the prospect of regime change.
“The president
then turned to General Caine. “General, what do you think?”
“General Caine
replied: ‘Sir, this is, in my experience, standard operating procedure for the
Israelis. They oversell, and their plans are not always well-developed. They
know they need us, and that’s why they’re hard selling.’” (ibid.)
“Mr. Trump
appeared to remain very interested in accomplishing the killing of the
ayatollah and Iran’s top leaders and dismantling the Iranian military.
“Over the
following days, General Caine shared with Trump and others the alarming
military assessment that a major campaign against Iran would drastically
deplete stockpiles of American weaponry, including missile interceptors, whose
supply had been strained after years of support for Ukraine and Israel. General
Caine saw no clear path to quickly replenishing these stockpiles. He also
flagged the enormous difficulty of securing the Strait of Hormuz and the risks
of Iran blocking it. Mr. Trump had dismissed that possibility, assuming the
regime would capitulate before it reached that point. The president appeared to
think it would be a very quick war.
“The president had
effectively made up his mind weeks earlier, several of his advisers said. But
he had not yet decided exactly when to start the war. Now, Netanyahu urged him
to move fast.”
I would add that a month earlier,
Trump organized a highly effective political takeover of Venezuela with the
kidnapping of President Nicolas Maduro and his wife, and quickly brought his
vice president to agree to change course and follow the U.S. dictates.
On January 3, 2026, Maduro was removed. The Venezuelan government remained in place, with Delcy Eloína Rodríguez Gómez sworn in as acting president on 5 January 2026.
Donald Trump recognized Delcy
Rodríguez as Venezuela's president and praised her administration. Furthermore,
Trump called her “president-elect,” despite her not being elected to the
position, and despite sufficient evidence of the illegitimacy of the government
of Nicolás Maduro, of which she was vice president. On 30 January, Rodríguez
announced an amnesty bill for political prisoners. By February, the US and
Venezuela had already resumed diplomatic relations, with the US Embassy in
Caracas reopened for the first time since its closure in 2019.Trump and his
administration made clear that access to Venezuelan oil was a core reason for
the action.[d] The US announced a 50-million-barrel oil supply deal with the
remaining government in Venezuela, with the first $300 million already received
on 20 January.[46] On 29 January, Rodríguez passed a new law giving private
companies control over the production and sale of oil. Trump expected a similar
scenario to play out in Iran.
Meanwhile, negotiations with the
Iranians did not produce what Trump wanted.
On Thursday, Feb. 26, around 5
p.m., a final Situation Room meeting got underway. Everything had been
discussed in previous meetings; everyone knew everyone else’s stance. The
discussion took about an hour and a half.
“ ‘I think we need
to do it,’ the president told the room. He said they had to make sure Iran
could not have a nuclear weapon, and they had to ensure that Iran could not
just shoot missiles at Israel or throughout the region.
“General Caine
told Mr. Trump that he had some time; he did not need to give the go-ahead
until 4 p.m. the following day.
“Aboard Air Force
One, the next afternoon, 22 minutes before General Caine’s deadline, Mr. Trump
sent the following order: ‘Operation Epic Fury is approved. No aborts. Good
luck.’” (ibid.)
The United States and Israel
launched a series of strikes against Iran on Feb. 28, 2026, bombing numerous
sites in Tehran and other cities across the country. Strikes killed Iran’s
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and several other members of Iran’s
leadership, including the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC), and the country’s defense minister. Iran responded by launching
missiles and drones at Israel and at U.S. military bases and other locations in
Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, including
oil and gas facilities.
U.S. military facilities in the
region, Israel, and energy and civilian infrastructure in the Persian Gulf
states. Israel launched a military offensive into southern Lebanon after
Hezbollah fired rockets at Israeli territory, while the Iran-backed Houthis in
Yemen launched ballistic missiles at Israel—both in solidarity with Iran amid
the broader regional war.
Tehran’s Assembly of Experts
appointed Ali Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba Khamenei, to succeed him on March 8.
The attack quickly escalated into a
regional war with widespread ramifications for critical supply chains and
humanitarian aid. Iran’s effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz has caused a
global energy shock. On April 7, Iran, Israel, and the United States agreed to
a two-week ceasefire but negotiations toward a broader settlement have stalled.
After the first meeting between
Iranian and U.S. high-level delegations mediated by Pakistan failed to produce
an agreement to end the war, Trump has unilaterally extended the ceasefire
indefinitely, apparently to continue pursuing diplomacy. Yet he imposed a
blockade of Iranian ports, which itself is an act of war. While back-channel
negotiations led to the possibility of an indirect negotiation in Islamabad
mediated by Pakistan, and the Iranian side sent a delegation, Trump called it
off, expressing unhappiness with Iranian demands.
These actions reflect the stalemate
of war. The U.S./Israeli aerial bombings have resulted in thousands of civilian
deaths and significant injuries among non-combatants. They have caused
widespread destruction of critical infrastructure, including hospitals,
schools, and transportation infrastructure in Iran. Many people have been displaced
from their homes. A severe economic downturn, with estimates of billions in
damages to the Iranian economy and significant environmental degradation,
including pollution and destruction of natural resources, has occurred.
Yet despite the assassination of Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei and a top layer of the Islamic Republic officials, the
U.S./Israeli war has failed to affect their central goal of regime change. The
goal of destroying the Iranian missile and drone capacities has also not been
achieved. U.S. bases in the Middle East have been destroyed, and assets of
Persian Gulf allies of the United States have been damaged. Allies of the
Islamic Republic have joined the extended war to attack Israel and the US
throughout the region.
Many commentators from across the
political spectrum said within a month after the start of the war that the US
had already lost the war with Iran. I will cite one mainstream commentator
Jim Lamson, senior research
associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, and a
visiting research fellow with the Department of War Studies at King’s College
London, said in an interview (Young, April 23, 2026):
“I don’t know
about describing it as such, but I would note that it remains unclear, and even
doubtful, as of April 21, whether Israel and the United States were able to
achieve their strategic goals in conducting both the 2025 and 2026 operations.
I also think it is uncertain and doubtful whether the clear strategic,
diplomatic, military, political, and economic costs to Israel, the United
States, and the Gulf states outweigh the benefits gained thus far.”
He added:
“Importantly, Iran
retained the capacity to continue strikes on Israel, U.S. bases in the Gulf,
the Gulf countries’ energy and other infrastructure, and commercial and
military ships in the Strait of Hormuz.
“Iran
was also able to impose high economic costs on Israel and the Gulf states,
damage U.S. bases and missile defense assets in the region, and was able to
force Israel, the United States, and Gulf states to burn through critical,
expensive, and slow-to-replenish offensive and defensive munitions. However, it
was unable to impose high costs on Israeli and U.S. military forces (apart from
the expenditure of munitions) or disrupt their air and missile operations
against Iran.”
“Iran
forced Israel, the United States, and the Gulf states to burn through many
critical, expensive, and slow-to-replenish offensive and defensive munitions.
Thus, in my view, it remains to be seen whether and to what extent Israel and
the United States will be able to translate their operational successes from
2025 and 2026 into strategic success.”
“As you said, the
extent of the damage to Israel remains unclear, but from what I can tell,
Iranian missiles and drones appeared to exact high costs against some Israeli
energy, economic, and other nonmilitary targets, and also to force Israel to
burn through a good deal of its critical, expensive, and slow-to-replenish
interceptors. However, it appears that Iran’s strikes were unable to impose
significant damage on Israel’s military capabilities, including those key to
its conduct of air and missile attacks against Iran.”
Young’s assessments quoted above
strike a balance between the sources that openly supported the U.S./Israeli war
on Iran and sources that have been openly critical of it. As in every war, each
party to the conflict exaggerates its gains and hides its losses. The Israeli
government, for example, made it exceedingly difficult to assess the damage
Iranian attacks have inflicted on its military and infrastructural assets.
What I like to focus on are a
number of geopolitical outcomes of the defeat of the U.S./Israeli war against
Iran.
Geopolitical outcomes of the war
The current stalemate in the war
will either end in a formal end to hostilities (Trump’s off-ramp option) or in
renewal of fighting. In the case of the former, the following set of
geopolitical changes will occur. I will briefly touch upon the possibility of
renewed fighting at the end of this essay.
1. A setback for U.S.
imperialism and Israeli Zionism and a relative strengthening of the position of
the Islamic Republic
Up until February 28 when the U.S.
and Israel began the current war, it was generally assumed that the position of
Israel and the United States have improved after two years of genocidal war in
Gaza and the “ceasefire” imposed by the United States 20 points “comprehensive
plan to end the Gaza conflict,” degrading of Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in
Lebanon and the fall of the Baathist regime in Syria. Correspondingly, it was
assumed that the Islamic Republic's position had been weakened. This was the
basic assumption underlying the June 2025 Israeli surprise attack on Iran called
“Rising Lion” to underscore its aim to overthrow the Islamic Republic and put
to power Reza Pahlavi, Israel's chosen candidate to restore the monarchy
symbolized in a flag of Iran with a lion at its center. Netanyahu convinced Donald
Trump to join him in the current war to overthrow the Islamic Republic after
the December-January protests.
These demonstrations began on
December 28 with merchants protesting the sharp decline of the rial, the
national currency, against the dollar, which made doing business impossible
(whatever they sold on one day, they had to restock at higher prices the next
day!). The unrest also followed widespread shortages linked to international
sanctions and government mismanagement.
However, protestors failed to also aim
at the economic war the US has been waging against Iran since the 1979
revolution and Trump’s Maximum Pressure campaign to hurt the Iranian economy
and people. In fact, the sudden collapse of the rial that angered the merchants
was enginnered by the Trump administration: “In a stunning admission, US
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said Washington engineered a dollar shortage
to send the Iranian rial into freefall that culminated with protesters taking
to the streets (Sharma, February 13, 2026).
The U.S. also intervened to incite
the protesters to armed violence: “U.S. forces sought to arm Iranian protesters
earlier this year after the country was rocked by demonstrations over dire
economic conditions, but saw those arms largely fall into the hands of Iran’s
Kurds (Bowden, April 5, 2026).
Israel also intervened in the
protests in January. “Beyond statements by the Mossad and Israel’s political
echelon, recent reports indicate a significant level of Mossad involvement. A
recent Channel 13 report revealed that the Mossad has transitioned from passive
observation to active ‘technical facilitation.’ (Sherman, January 16, 2026)”
The war has proved that the Islamic
Republic relies not on individual leaders but on institutions built in the past
47 years, and that it still enjoys the support of a sizeable section of the
Iranian population of 95 million. Even though many Iranians prefer another form
of rule, they have rallied against the imposed war by Israel and the United
States, which has caused so much human suffering and infrastructure damage. As
of this writing, the Pentagon
says it struck over 13,000 targets during ‘Epic Fury’, including missiles,
launchers, navy ships, and factories. Iran’s fire remained steady despite heavy
strikes.
Yet, the United States lost the war in the first week. Let The New York Times editors explain it. In their April 30, editorial titled "The U.S. Military Was Losing Its Edge. After Iran, Everyone Knows It," they wrote:
"On paper, the war in Iran should not be much of a
contest. The United States spends around $1 trillion a year on its military,
more than 100 times as much as Iran. That money buys a vastly larger Air Force
and Navy, as well as advanced weapons technologies that Iranian generals can
only dream about.
“In the
war’s early days, the mismatch played out as one might expect. American forces
destroyed much of the Iranian military. Now, however, the contest looks less
one-sided. Iran has taken control of the Strait of Hormuz, and its missiles and
drones still threaten America’s allies in the region. While President Trump
seems eager for a negotiated truce, Iran’s leaders do not. Somehow, the weaker
nation is in the stronger negotiating position.
“That
reality exposes the vulnerabilities in the American way of war. Tactical
success has not yielded victory. Mr. Trump’s recklessness in conducting the war is one reason. But the problem is bigger than any
single commander in chief. The United States has left itself unprepared for
modern war.
“America
has spent hundreds of billions of dollars on ships and planes that are good at
defeating competitors’ ships and planes but ineffective against cheaper,
mass-produced weapons. The American economy does not have the industrial capacity to produce enough of the weapons and equipment it
does need. And the country has struggled to fix these problems because of
a sclerotic government and a consolidated defense industry that resists change.”
Second, the war has shattered
illusions among some Iranians who believed the United States and Israel would overthrow
the Islamic Republic to improve their lives. Reza Pahlavi, who at age 65
entered the fray to present himself as an alternative to the Islamic Republic
by bringing back the Pahlavi dynasty, has been discredited. Pahlavi has been
Israel’s choice to replace the Islamic Republic. Mohammad Reza Pahavi’s
U.S.-installed and supported dictatorship was overthrown by the most massive
urban uprising in the 20th century. It was an important ally of the
Zionist regime as well as the South African apartheid.
Third, the Israeli plan to sow divisions
among the Iranian working people, especially by urging the Kurdish
organizations fighting for autonomy to join the Israeli/U.S., did not
materialize, although some Kurdish leaders had initially joined Reza Pahlavi’s
campaign to restore the monarchy.
Fourth, Gulf States that relied on the United States for protection by allowing US bases to operate in their country saw that these bases were severely damaged early in the war by the Iranian missiles and drones, as were some of the economic assets they hoped the Americans would protect. The presence of American forces has not prevented escalation; it has invited it. The war sharpened their political differences, especially among the Saudi’s and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), as the latter broke ranks with the other Gulf states and with OPEC and drew closer to Israel. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been fighting a proxy war in Yemen and in the Sudan for some time. It remains to be seen whether the Gulf states will continue to allow U.S. bases on their soil. Fifth, tensions between the U.S. and key
The impact of the U.S. inability to reach its goal of regime change in Iran and the Iranians' ability to resist and fight back has had geopolitical impacts beyond the Middle East. European countries like France, Germany, and even Britain, which have historically been close allies of the United States, have increased, and Western imperialism and NATO have weakened because of the unilateral decision of the Trump administration to go to war, and the same countries have begun questioning their relationship with Israel. European leaders refused Trump’s call for military assistance to reopen the
Strait of Hormuz, as did Japan, South Korea, Russia, and China. Russia, which
is heavily sanctioned by the United States, saw a windfall when the Trump
administration removed restrictions on the sale of its oil in the world market
to help alleviate the oil shortage. Ten percent of China’s oil consumption comes
through the Strait of Hormuz. Thus, China opposed the U.S./Israeli war against
Iran as “unnecessary,” and Xi warned about “the law of the jungle” replacing
international laws. At the same time, the success of Iran in resisting the
U.S./Israeli war, both nuclear powers possessing high-technology modern armies,
showed its ability to face a potential war over its claim to Taiwan. Thus,
Trump faces two difficult issues in his upcoming summit with Xi. The war
reflected the ascendancy of China and the relative decline of the U.S. and
Western imperialism. According to SWIFT (April 2025)[1]:
The RMB is now the third most-used currency for global trade settlements,
behind the USD and the Euro. The emerging decline of the dollar is a hallmark
of the U.S.'s relative decline as the world hegemon. In 1944, the Bretton Woods
Agreement established the dollar as the primary reserve currency linked to gold,
itself a reflection of the onset of the American Century. It was backed by the
economic superiority of U.S. capitalism over its rivals and by its replacement
of Britain as the hegemonic imperialist power.
Cuba, which is on Trump's list for regime change and is facing an inhumane oil blockade, is resisting Washington while negotiating with Trump. Unlike Venezuela, Cuba has institutionalized its revolution, defeated U.S.-backed mercenaries in the Bay of Pigs in April 1961, and has prepared its population to fight any U.S. invasion. The defeat of the U.S. imperialist war against Iran gives the Cubans an added confidence that it is possible to defeat the most powerful army in the world.
The Persian Gulf states remain bastions
of reactionary regimes and policies and are extraordinarily vulnerable (see Appendix
1). Fifth, for years, U.S. policymakers presented Iran as a state that could be
isolated, sanctioned, and gradually weakened under a prolonged containment
strategy. The assumption was that Tehran would remain strategically boxed in.
That strategy has failed. In fact, the Obama administration’s negotiation with
the Islamic Republic was based on the recognition that force is not sufficient
to contain Iran. Trump’s rejection of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA) showed a desire to return to the use of force to contain Iran. The
current war has proven him wrong, forcing him to negotiate a resolution.
Iran has demonstrated that it
possesses both the capacity and the willingness to disrupt the entire regional
order if pushed to the brink. Missile capabilities, regional alliances, and
maritime leverage give Tehran tools that extend far beyond its borders.
Sixth, it follows that Iranian
rights, interests, and security concerns cannot simply be dismissed. A
sustainable regional order cannot be built on the permanent marginalization of
one of its central actors.
Seventh, the idea to coax Arab
regimes to accept Israel as a technological, military, and intelligence power
capable of protecting its new Arab partners from regional threats has also been
undermined, even though AUE is aligning itself more with Israel and the United
States.
Eight, the Idea that unconditional
support for Israel is essential to the U.S. interest in the Middle East is
being challenged. Even among some Israelis, it is being understood that their
state is responsible for the ongoing wars with their neighbors and that the
very idea of founding a Jewish state in Palestine has resulted in an apartheid
state, which they cannot support. Israel is being questioned by an increasing
number of young Americans and Europeans.
Finally, the war with Iran is
undermining the America First/Make America Great Again coalition. Trump is
losing support. At the time of this writing, only
39.2% of the U.S. public supports the war. 54.4% oppose it. Only
39.0% approve of Trump’s presidency, while 58% disapprove of it.
A final note
As I have argued earlier (Nayeri,
March 16, 2026), the Israeli/US war against Iran has its roots in their
opposition to the 1979 national democratic revolution that overthrew the
U.S.-installed dictatorship of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who was also a supporter
of Zionism and South Africa’s apartheid regime. The most massive urban uprising
of the twentieth century was a national democratic revolution that aimed for
national independence, freedom, and social justice.
Because of the anti-communist
nature of the Shah’s regime, socialist and labor movements were suppressed
harshly. In comparison, the Shia clergy was given some freedom. Ayatollah
Khomeini, who opposed the Shah’s capitalist modernization programs, was exiled.
Through the work of allies within the Shia establishment, he emerged as the
leading political figure by November 1978. When the masses overthrew the
monarchy in the February 9-11 insurrection, power was handed to Ayatollah Khomeini.
The Islamic Republic was the
brainchild of Ayatollah Khomeini, who in the early 1970s wrote a pamphlet
advocating the creation of an Islamic government ruled by Velayat-e Faghih
(Islamic Jurisprudence) to unify Muslims (at least Shiites). This vision requires
expanding the Islamic Republic's power across the Middle East. Thus, the stage
has been set for conflict with the U.S. imperialism and Israeli Zionism that
also want to dominate the Middle East. The current stalemate in the war shows
the dead end of the reactionary ideologies of imperialism, Zionism, and Islamic
fundamentalism.
As it is also a war for control
over Middle Eastern oil, it underscores that it is also a sign of the crisis of
the anthropocentric, industrial capitalist civilization. In an
interview with Tucker Carlson, Jeffrey Sachs discusses the devastating effects
of the resumption of fighting by the Trump administration if negotiations with
the Islamic Republic fail to end the war. He bases his argument on a study he conducted
on stagflation of 1973-79 (Sachs, 1985; for a review, see Rogerson, 1987). Stagflation
is the condition in which incomes sink too low and prices spiral, resulting in
mass unemployment, devastating the world capitalist economy.
This potentiality, and not Trump’s
concern about “bombing Iran to the stone age” as a war crime, ties his hand to escalate
the war. Thus, he may have to accept giving concessions to the Islamic
Republic.
However, as I have already outlined
(ibid.), the struggle over control of the production and supply of oil
demonstrates the sheer blindness of the warring states to the need to
transition to renewable energy, because the status quo is unsustainable. Even
Jeffrey Sachs’s view as an economist blinds him to considering the existential
crisis of climate change.
As Francis and Fonseca (2025) point
out:
“Model projections
for the ‘business-as-usual’ climate change scenario indicate that half of the
population in the Middle East and North African region (roughly 600 million
people) could be exposed to recurring super- and ultra-extreme heatwaves, which
will feature air temperatures up to 56 °C and higher lasting for several weeks
at a time, in the second half of this century21. Even though the aridity in the
MENA region has significantly increased in recent decades, extreme rainfall
events may be more impactful in a warming world (Francis and Fonseca, 2024).”
The working people, the only social
force that can stop this madness, must demand an end to the U.S. and Israeli
war against Iran and organize ourself to discuss and adopt alternative for a
better world in which humans would live in peace with each other and with the
rest of life on Earth.
Reference:
Bowden, John. “Trump
Says US Sent ‘A Lot’ of Guns to Arm Iranian Protesters But Believes ‘the Kurds
Took’ Them: Report.” Independent. April 5, 2026.
Francis, Diana and Ricardo Fonseca.
“Recent and
projected changes in climate patterns in the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) region.” Nature. May 4, 2024.
Rogerson, Richard. “The
Economics of Worldwide Stagflation: A Review Essay.” Journal of Monetary
Economics. 19 (1987) 129-136. 1987.
Sachs, Jeffrey. Economics of Worldwide
Stagflation. 1985.
Sharma, Yashraj. “US
Says It Caused Dollar Shortage to Trigger Iran Protests: What That Means.”
Aljazeera, February 13, 2026.
Sherman, Shimon. “Fact
vs. Fiction: The Mossad’s Role in the 2026 Iran Uprising.” JNS. January 16,
2026.
Swan, Jonathan, and Maggie Haberman.
“How
Trump Took the U.S. to War With Iran,” The New York Times, April 7, 2026.
The New York Times Editors. "The U.S. Military Was Losing Its Edge. After Iran, Everyone Knows It." The New York Times. April 30, 2026.
Young, Michael. “A Military Balance Sheet in the U.S. and Israeli War With Iran.” Malcom H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, April, 23, 2026.
Appendix
1. Persian Gulf States
Let’s briefly note their history
and their vulnerabilities. Saudi Arabia is the fifth-largest country in Asia,
the largest in the Middle East, and the twelfth largest in the world. However,
95% of it is desert. It was founded in 1932 by King Abdulaziz, who united
Hejaz, Najd, parts of Eastern Arabia, and South Arabia (Asir) into a single
state through a series of military and political campaigns beginning in 1901.
It is an absolute monarchy. Oil was discovered in 1938, and Saudi Arabia has
become the world's second-largest oil producer and leading oil exporter,
controlling the world's second-largest oil reserves and sixth-largest gas
reserves. The Saudi economy is the largest in the Middle East and the world's nineteenth-largest
by nominal GDP and seventeenth-largest by PPP. With a population of almost 32.2
million, Saudi Arabia is the fourth most populous country in the Arab world.
But some 42% of its inhabitants are immigrants, mostly from the Middle East,
South Asia, and Africa. Saudi Arabia has limited freshwater resources and
relies heavily on desalination for drinking water. The country imports
approximately 80% of its food due to the arid climate and low agricultural
output. In brief, Saudi Arabia’s future depends on oil and gas production and
exports, on immigrant workers, on the production and sale of fossil fuels, on
desalination plans for water, and on the importation of food to maintain the
absolute monarchy.
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a
federal semi-constitutional monarchy comprising seven emirates, with Abu Dhabi
as its national capital. It was a British protectorate that achieved
independence in 1971. The UAE is considered a middle power in global affairs.
Of its 11.7 million inhabitants, only 11% are native Emiratis; the vast
majority are expatriates and migrant workers, most of whom are from South Asia.
The UAE has the world's seventh-largest oil reserves and seventh-largest
natural gas reserves. The UAE relies
heavily on desalination to meet its freshwater needs due to limited natural
water resources. It imports 90% of its food.
Qatar is approximately 11,586
square kilometers (4,473 square miles) and has been ruled as a hereditary
monarchy by the House of Thani since Mohammed bin Thani signed an agreement
with Britain in 1868 that recognized its separate status. Qatar has a population
of approximately 2.9 million people, of whom 88% are expatriates. It became a
British protectorate in the early 20th century and gained independence in 1971.
Oil was discovered in the 1940s. Qatar relies heavily on desalination for its
freshwater supply due to limited natural water resources. Ninety percent of its
food is imported.
Kuwait covers approximately 17,818
square kilometers (6,880 square miles).In the early 18th century, the territory
of modern-day Kuwait was under the jurisdiction of the Bani Khalid clan; it
became known as the Sheikdom of Kuwait in 1752 and a British protectorate in
1899. Prior to the discovery of oil reserves in 1938, the territory of
modern-day Kuwait served as a regional trade hub. The protectorate agreements
with the United Kingdom ended in June 1961 when Kuwait officially became an
independent state. Kuwait has a
population of 3 million, of which 60% are expatriates. Kuwait is a
constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system. The Emir is the head of
state and holds significant powers. Kuwait is a constitutional monarchy with a
parliamentary system. Water resources are scarce; the country relies on
desalination for nearly all its drinking water. Kuwait imports 90% of its food.
The Emir is the head of state and
holds significant powers.
The Sultanate of Oman is the oldest independent state in the Arab world and has been continuously ruled by the Al Bu Said dynasty since 1744. Oman's oil reserves rank 22nd globally. In 2010, the United Nations Development Program recognized Oman as the most improved country in the world over the preceding 40 years. Less reliant on fossil fuels than other Persian Gulf states, a portion of Oman's economy involves tourism and the trade of fish, dates, and other agricultural produce. The World Bank classifies Oman as a high-income economy. As of 2024, Oman ranks 42nd among the world's most peaceful countries in the Global Peace Index. Oman has limited freshwater resources, relying heavily on groundwater and desalination. Agriculture is challenged by arid climate conditions, making food production difficult. The country imports a significant share of its food, raising concerns about food security. Water scarcity impacts agricultural productivity and food prices. Climate change poses additional risks to water availability and agricultural output.
Endnotes:
[1] The
Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) system is
a global messaging network that enables secure and efficient international
money and securities transfers. Founded in 1973 as a faster and more reliable
alternative to the telex system, SWIFT now connects more than 11,000 financial
institutions worldwide.
